Given the policy salience of bilateral trade deficits, it is peculiar that no one has ever examined them empirically for a broad set of countries. One reason for the scant study is that economists are naturally (and sensibly) loath to accept the terms of the policy debate, which considers bilateral trade deficits ipso facto harmful. A second reason is that economists believe there may be very natural explanations for bilateral imbalances. One such explanation finds its origins in macroeconomic identities that equate current-account deficits to an excess of investment over saving. From this, it may be argued that bilateral imbalances will arise naturally in trade between countries in aggregate surplus and those in aggregate deficit. Indeed, this is the principal explanation that the profession has given policymakers, and it forms the foundation of many U.S. bilateral trade initiatives such as the Structural Impediments Initiative and the Framework talks. Janow (1994 p. 55) observes that "there was (and is) little disagreement among economists that the causes of large aggregate and bilateral deficits are largely attributable to macroeconomic factors" [italics added]. A second account may rely on what may be termed "triangular trade," in which cross-country differences in the patterns of demand and supply mean that a country will run bilateral deficits with those countries that are unusually important suppliers of the goods for which the deficit country happens to be an unusually strong demander.
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In this paper, we use the canonical "gravity model" of bilateral trade to form predictions about bilateral trade balances. We develop two key variants of the model, in which bilateral trade imbalances arise due to aggregate macroeconomic imbalances or due to "triangular trade," and we implement these empirically for a broad set of countries. Our results paint a dismal picture. The central explanations that economists provide to explain bilateral balances perform miserably. There are two key failures. First, actual bilateral trade imbalances are much larger than those predicted; there is a "mystery of excess trade balances." Second, even after we allow for both macroeconomic imbalances and idiosyncrasies in the structure and levels of demand and production, the models perform poorly in explaining bilateral trade balances. These failures of economists' standard explanations of bilateral trade imbalances require that we move beyond the simple gravity framework to consider alternative explanations: homogeneous goods, highly specialized intermediates, and the role of policy.
I. Theory
The dominant intellectual paradigm for understanding bilateral trade patterns is the socalled gravity model of trade. This then also seems an appropriate starting point for making sense of bilateral trade imbalances. We will start with a very simple model that ignores trade frictions, incorporating these explicitly only when we turn to empirics.
Let Xc be GDP in country c, and let sc be its share of world spending. Let world GDP be 
II. Empirics
The empirical question we examine can be stated simply. How successful is the gravity model and simple amendments, as embodied above in equations (1) We begin by estimating equation (7) using aggregate bilateral exports as our dependent variable, GDP as our proxy for X, and GDP plus the current account as our proxy for sc. The estimation is based on a Tobit procedure. The fits and coefficient estimates are entirely conventional. We then take the exponential of the fitted values to calculate estimated bilateral balances, E -E We plot these against the actual imbalances ECC -EC'C in Figure 1 .
These results may be interpreted as a simple test of the macroeconomic balance approach to Here, Xi, is defined as industry output, and the share of absorption is defined as output less net trade in that sector. Once we estimated this equation, we then took the exponential of the fitted values to calculate estimated sectoral bilateral balances, Ei,, -Eic,. We then summed these across all sectors and plotted them against the actual imbalances ECC' -EC'C This specification employs much more information in order to predict bilateral flows. Not only do we allow absorption and output to vary across countries, but we also now use 180 parameters instead of five.
We could plot these results, and they would look slightly better than those in Figure 1 . This is not really surprising given the great increase in parameters and explanatory variables. What is perhaps more surprising is that this does not eliminate the excess-trade-balance phenomenon. The variance of actual trade balances is still 4.5 times larger than the variance of predicted balances. Moreover, regressing predicted bilateral balances against actual balances reveals that the model's prediction picks up very little of the variation in the actual balances.
Once again, when we look within sectors, the same problem that we saw in the aggregateflows data emerges: there is much more variability in export flows than one might expect even given the cross-country differences in demand and production patterns. Consider the case of the third-largest export sector, electrical machinery. The United States absorbs 19 percent of the world supply of this industry. However, only 5 percent of Chinese electrical machinery was shipped to the United States while the corresponding numbers for Hong Kong, Japan, and the Philippines stood at 25, 34, and a whopping 54 percent.
III. Conclusion
Bilateral trade balances are an important source of frictions in international trade relations, so it is important to understand their provenance. In this paper, we provide an empirical examination of two key theories-one based on macroeconomic balances and the other based on triangular trade. The theories perform poorly in explaining bilateral trade balances. Actual bilateral trade balances are vastly larger than those predicted by theory, a result that may be termed the "mystery of the excess trade balances." The poor performance of the model is likewise confirmed by the poor overall fits and the very weak ability even to predict the sign of the bilateral trade balances. The failure of these models to explain actual bilateral trade balances does not imply that bilateral protection is the source of these imbalances. However, it should force international economists to reflect on the deficiencies of the gravity framework in this regard and to consider alternative explanations (possibly including bilateral protection) for understanding these mysteries.
